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Why Kant is a Non-Conceptualist 
but is better regarded a Conceptualist  
 
 
Corijn van Mazijk  





his paper deals with the problem of characterizing 
the content of experience as either conceptual or 
non-conceptual in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, 
a topic widely debated in contemporary philosophy. I start 
out with Kant’s pre-critical discussions of space and time in 
which he develops a specific notion of non-conceptual 
content. Secondly, I show that this notion of non-conceptual 
intuitional content does not seem to match well with the 
Transcendental Deduction. This incongruity results in three 
interrelated problems that are inherent to Kant’s Trans-
cendental Deduction in the Critique1: the ‘Independency 
Disagreement’, the ‘Conceptualism Contradiction’ and the 
‘Intuition Inconsistency’. These three problems derive from 
apparently contradictory claims concerning the possibility of 
non-conceptual content. Contemporary Kantian concept-
ualists and non-conceptualists tend to take a stance at either 
side of the dilemma rather than trying to dissolve these 
tensions. In response to this, I propose a new solution to 
these difficulties based on a distinction between two kinds of 
conceptualism. This will reveal why Kant is a non-
conceptualist in one significant sense, but also why he is still 
better regarded a conceptualist. 
 
                                                            
1 I will use the standard A/B abbreviations for the first and second edition of 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. For all other works of Kant no standard 
abbreviations are used. 
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ecently, the question whether the content of intuition 
(or perception) is necessarily invested with concepts 
in some way or other has received a great deal of 
attention by philosophers of mind, phenomenologists and 
Kant scholars. The two canonical positions one can take in 
are that of conceptualism and non-conceptualism. Non-
conceptualists may defend a variety of theses, but all of 
them involve the idea that there would exist mental contents 
that are not informed by concepts and/or are not open to 
being conceptualized by the subject. Conceptualism, by 
contrast, is often taken to be the doctrine that the kind of 
mental representations humans have when they sense and 
perceive the world are essentially reliant on capacities that 
are involved in thinking. Another way to put this is to say 
that the contents of human intuition would not have been the 
way they are without the subject’s possession of the relevant 
concepts required to explicate the content in a judgment. 
Conceptualists may argue that those who believe in non-
conceptual intuition invoke something we do not need, for 
what cannot be conceptualized cannot be appropriated into 
the ‘space of reasons’ and thus has no effect on our beliefs. 
Further, since it lacks such an effect, we could not even 
know whether they truly exist, and therefore non-conceptual 
contents are useless and mysterious ‘Givens’.2 Non-
conceptualists often respond to this that to regard all mental 
content as conceptual involves an over-intellectualization of 
human experience. 
 This paper deals with the problem of (non-)conceptual 
content in the critical philosophy of Kant’s first Critique. 
The aim of the first section is to show how Kant came to 
conceive of  intuition as non-conceptual, for which I will 
take some of his pre-critical writings into account. In the 
following two sections I focus mostly on the Transcendental 
                                                            2	  See:	  Wilfrid	  Sellars	  (1963)	  and	  also	  John	  McDowell	  (1994).	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Deduction, which, as I will show, appears to contradict the 
relation between intuition and concept found in Kant’s pre-
critical writings and also in the Transcendental Aesthetic. 
This results in three interrelated problems. I dub these the 
Independency Disagreement, the Conceptualism Contra-
diction and the Intuition Inconsistency. I the following 
sections, I turn to contemporary readings of Kant that 
interpret Kant as a full-blown non-conceptualist. I will claim 
that these attempts fail. I then propose an alternative solution 
to the debate over Kantian conceptualism by introducing a 
distinction between two kinds of content. With this 
distinction in mind, one can see how Kant could have been a 
non-conceptualist, even though, in the light of his own 




lready in his 1755 work New Elucidation of the 
First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition, Kant 
committed himself to the insufficiency of con-
ceptual connections alone for making judgments about the 
actual existence of objects.3 Kant here develops an argument 
to criticize theistic lines of reasoning that serve to prove the 
existence of God. Simply put, he tries to show that ideal 
connections of objective and predicative elements do not yet 
say anything about objects and predicates really existing. 
Consider the following fragment:  
 
Form for yourself the concept of some being or other 
in which there is a totality of reality. It must be con-
ceded that, given this concept, existence also has to be 
attributed to this being. But if all those realities are only 
conceived as  united together, then the existence of that 
being is also only an existence of  ideas (Kant 1992, 
p. 15) 
                                                            
3 See also Paul Guyer (2005). 
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Kant’s point is that to think of any object whatsoever as 
existing, even granted that there are no contradictions 
inherent to the object as thought, does not suffice to prove 
the actual being of that object. Kant does not yet, however, 
exploit this claim concerning the shortcomings of judgments 
of existence that are based merely on conceptual analysis by 
stipulating the necessity of a reference to what is given in an 
intuition. In 17684, still over twelve years prior to the 
publication of the first Critique, Kant points once more to 
the importance of an element of experience operative 
besides the intellect. This time, the argument fits ongoing 
debates on the nature of space between Clarke’s absolutist 
and Leibniz relational account. On the standard absolutist 
view of the time, the motion of objects has to be understood 
in relation to a background of absolute space which exists 
prior and independently of objects.5 Against this, Leibniz’s 
relational theory dismisses the necessity of space by 
reducing it or making it wholly dependent upon relations 
that obtain between objects. In short, Kant wanted to show 
that certain properties of objects cannot be accounted for in 
terms of conceptual relations only. His most famous 
argument for this, usually called the argument from 
incongruent counterparts, is supposed to point to a 
shortcoming in Leibniz’s account of space and to strengthen 
the absolutist position, which Kant would continue to adopt 
in altered form in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first 
Critique.  
 Kant’s basic line of reasoning runs as follows. Imagine 
that God would create the three-dimensional universe and 
subsequently went on to install one human hand in it. 
According to Kant, given that there are as of yet no 
                                                            
4 Immanuel Kant (2003) Concerning the ultimate ground of the differen-
tiation of directions in space, In: The Cambridge Edition to the Works of 
Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, ed. D. Walford, E. 
Meerbote, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
5 See also: John Earman (1991) and Janiak (2012) for introductions to this 
debate. 
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embodied observers in this universe obtaining a perspective 
relative to the hand, it would be impossible to determine the 
being left or right of it, given that these objects are 
mathematically identical in every other respect. Accord-
ingly, the relational account, which only considers intellect-
ually the various conceptual relations manifest between 
different points in space, must also be unable to decide 
whether the hand is a right or left one. The connections of 
spatial points considered solely from a geometrical point of 
view do not allow one to differentiate between objects that 
are identical qua formal spatial relations. This led Kant to 
believe there to be something in our experience of hands and 
similar objects which does not derive from nor is explain-
able solely in terms of mathematical relations.  
 
         ╠ ╣                                           ╒  ╕ 
      Congruent counterpart            Incongruent counterpart 
 
In the above figure, reduced to two-dimensional space for 
simplicity’s sake, the left two objects can be made to fit onto 
each other by rotating them. Although counterparts, Kant 
would say that an assessment of their being in terms of 
spatial relations suffices for complete description. The two 
objects on the right, however, cannot be made to fit each 
other through rotation, and are thus different in a way 
transcending capacities for geometrical conceptualization. 
The conclusion is twofold. First, incongruent counterparts 
are such that they cannot be consistently accounted for if one 
considers space relationally. Second, some part of our em-
pirical cognition of real objects must depend on how they 
are given to us in a specific manner that is extra-conceptual.  
Two years later, in 1770, Kant takes one step further in 
explicating the consequence of his argument from incon-
gruent counterparts in new terms. Since space does not 
belong to our capacity for conceptualization, it is now taken 
to belong to intuition. Again later, in a paper called What 
Does It Mean To Orient Oneself in Thinking? published in 
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between the two editions of the Critique, Kant once more 
draws on the non-conceptual nature of what he now calls 
our ‘orientation’ with regard to objects. To know left from 
right is not just inexplicable intellectually; it belongs to a part 
of our subjective constitution that is independent from 
capacities that belong to the understanding and the concepts 
inherent to it.  
The importance of a second constitutive element of 
knowledge besides the intellect thus pressed upon Kant from 
the beginning of his academic career, first through his 
refutation of arguments for the existence of God and later 
through his views on space. His position in both discussions 
shaped the content of the first Critique, especially with 
regard to the Transcendental Aesthetic. The main argument 
here presented for the subjective ideality of absolute space 
differs from his earlier ones. In the Metaphysical Exposition, 
Kant shows that the structuring capacities of space and time 
already underlie any possible representation whatsoever. 
One cannot even perform mathematical or geometrical 
calculations purely in the head without having invoked 
absolute space or time (A19/B33-A49-B66). Kant believes 
it follows that (a) space and time cannot be empirically 
deduced from any experience since every experience must 
already contain them, and (b) that they can only be trans-
cendentally deduced, that is: their operations have to be 
taken as necessary conditions to any experience. It follows 
that (c) space and time are a priori forms of intuition which 
(d) cannot as such be representations in themselves.6 
Although there is a brief mention of it in the Prolegomena, 
the Transcendental Aesthetic makes no explicit reference to 
the argument from incongruent counterparts, which is 
slightly confusing, for the claim that space and time are a 
priori intuitions rather than concepts seems now less 
supported than it could have been. It is thus useful to look at 
Kant’s pre-critical writings to get an impression of why 
there has to be a non-conceptual element to experience. 
                                                            
6 See especially: CPR A22/A31, B37/46. 
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The Critique exploits the required non-conceptual ele-
ment in terms of pure intuitions that belong to a faculty of 
receptivity. Here the manifold of sensations are combined 
into intuitions. Space and time, in this respect, are pure 
intuitions; they contain only the form of intuition. Whereas 
intuitions represent external objects immediately, concepts – 
which belong to the faculty of understanding – do so in a 
mediate fashion. Intuition is repraesentatio singularis; 
concept repraesentatio universalis. The human cognitive 
apparatus has thereby essentially been split into two: 
sensibility and understanding, which produce concepts and 
intuitions respectively, each of which has both an empirical 
and a pure part. It is interesting to note that in contrast with 
his account of pure intuitions (Metaphysical Exposition) and 
pure concepts (Transcendental Deduction), Kant does not 
provide any transcendental arguments for this divide. The 
dual structure of our cognizing systems appears to be a bare 
fact that cannot be explained any further (CPR B145-146). 
Kant’s views regarding the necessity of  the non-
conceptual – and thus intuitional – nature of our experiences 
of space and time fits his critical aims of the Critique that 
followed in 1781. Kant believed that metaphysics before 
him had never yielded any progress due to a lack of 
understanding of the limits and conditions of cognition. It is 
essential to Kant’s critical project that experience and 
cognition are conceived of as consisting of a cooperation of 
intuitions and concepts. Knowledge is always empirical 
knowledge: it is the product of combining empirical 
intuitions – intuitions with a posteriori sensational content – 
with the categories of the understanding (a priori concepts). 
The pure understanding has no meaning of its own (CPR 
B146-147, A246/B303); it has to be applied to intuition if it 
is to serve any purpose. All sense and experience is, then, 
ultimately conditioned by the ‘raw material of sensible 
sensations’ (CPR A1), as that to which all cognition must 
have its possible reference if it is to avoid taking part in the 
progressless efforts of the dogmatic metaphysicians that 
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preceded Kant.  
 Right at the opening of the Critique, Kant strengthens the 
foundations of his groundbreaking idea that a cooperation of 
intuitions and concepts is necessary for experience. He 
asserts that both elements are brought forth by their own 
distinct source of knowledge. The function of bringing forth 
intuitions and concepts is, in each case, restricted to that 
single source from which it rises, and thus cannot be taken 
over by the other:  
 
Objects are therefore given to us by means of sen-
sibility, and it alone affords us intuitions; but they are 
thought through the understanding, and from it arise 
concepts (CPR A19/B33 my italics).  
 
With this assertion Kant seems to make it unambiguously 
clear that the human cognitive apparatus has two distinct 
sources which produce two equally distinct elements of 
experience. One source, receptivity or sensibility, provides 
me with intuitions, while the spontaneity of the under-
standing brings forth concepts. This separation seems to 
require upholding the following three important claims 
pertaining the cooperation and independency of intuitions 
and concepts: 
 
(1) Sensibility and understanding are two heterogeneous 
sources that provide  intuitions and concepts indepen-
dently from  each other. Neither can take over this 
specific task from the other (the ‘Independency 
Thesis’). 
 
(2) Intuitions must be non-conceptual.7 
 
                                                            
7 To summarize why: (a) they are produced distinctly from concepts and the 
understanding, (b) the immediate experience of space/time cannot itself be a 
concept, (c) the immediate experience of space/time as pure intuitions must 
already underlie all representations of them, and (d) conceptual analysis only 
cannot yield expression of incongruent counterparts. 
                      KSO 2014:  
 
 
Corijn van Mazijk, Why Kant is a Non-Conceptualist 
but is better regarded a Conceptualist,  
 KSO 2014: 170-200, Posted June 28, 2014 
www.kantstudiesonline.net 




(3) Intuitions and concepts must cooperate if experience 
and objective knowledge are to come about. 
 
These three claims all express Kant’s positive attitude 
toward non-conceptual content which today’s Kantian non-
conceptualists wish to highlight. In the next section, I will try 
to show why claim (1) and (2) contradict other important 
claims made in the Critique, mostly found in the Trans-
cendental Deduction. The Transcendental Deduction is a 
section central to the Critique where Kant establishes the a 
priori rule of the concepts of the understanding with regard 
to all intuition. For that reason, it has been the major point of 
focus of Kantian conceptualists. The argument central to it, 
however, appears to slight the independency intuition is 
supposed to have according to the Transcendental Aesthetic 
and Kant’s pre-critical works. This will result in three 
interrelated problems regarding the relation between concept 
and intuition as expressed in (3). I will address these three 
problems as follows: the Independency Disagreement, the 





he important question to consider at this point is, 
given the necessity of a cooperation of concepts and 
empirical intuitions for objective knowledge and 
experience in general, how exactly Kant conceives of this to 
work. In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant deals ex-
plicitly with the transcendental structure of this necessary 
cooperation, which takes the form of what he calls synthesis. 
Objective knowledge must be the mixed product of a priori 
concepts and intuitions, and thus requires an act of the 
understanding, to which these concepts belong, through 
which empirical intuitions can be ‘subsumed’ under pure 
concepts. The primary aim of the Transcendental Deduction 
is, however, not just to prove a necessary cooperation, but to 
T 
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show that the a priori concepts of the understanding – a 
limited set of pure concepts which he exposed earlier in the 
Metaphysical Deduction – apply to and are conditions for all 
possible experiences, and are thus truly transcendental. To 
establish this, Kant further deems it necessary to show that 
all appearances, i.e., intuitions, must stand under the rules of 
the understanding. Concepts thus have a double function: 
they serve as components in judgments and as rules in 
appearances. This latter part, through which concepts come 
to be involved in the perception, thus enabling experience, is 
called synthesis. The primary aim of the Transcendental 
Deduction is then to show that the a priori concepts that 
belong to the understanding apply as rules to all possible 
experience. If they would not do so, they would not truly 
condition all experience and hence would not be a priori. 
Since concepts are by their very nature mediate, they require 
– unlike the pure intuitions of sensibility, which are 
immediate – a special kind of proof that affirms their a 
priori status. This demand is to be fulfilled by the Trans-
cendental Deduction. 
 In brief, according to Kant’s A-Deduction, the acts of 
syntheses constitutive of experience demand from the side 
of our subjective constitution three sources: sense, imagin-
ation and the synthetic unity of apperception (CPR A115). 
Sense here simply means empirical, contentful intuitions as 
they are supplied through perception (intuition). The syn-
thetic unity of apperception is best explained in the B-
Deduction, where Kant writes that: 
 
The I think must be able to accompany all my 
representations, for otherwise something would be 
represented in me that could not be thought at all, 
which is as much as to say that the representation 
would either be impossible or else at least would be 
nothing for me (CPR B132).  
 
Kant here asserts that it is only because I can potentially 
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combine any given manifold of sensations into a single, 
unitary consciousness that I can make judgments about it, 
and only to that extent can the content be said to exist at all. 
The unity of apperception is therefore a transcendental con-
dition for all objective experience. In the B-edition of the 
Deduction, Kant calls it the ‘supreme principle’ of all 
cooperative activities of sensibility and understanding, thus 
of all synthesis, knowledge and significance in general (CPR 
B136, A240/B299). 
 So how does Kant bridge the cooperation of two hetero-
geneous sources of knowledge, sensible intuitions and 
categories of the understanding respectively? In the A-
Deduction, this question seems to come down to the role of 
the imagination in the transcendental structure of experience. 
Imagination in the A-Deduction is at times described as the 
‘faculty of synthesis’ (CPR A120). It is taken as a faculty of 
its own that stands in mediation between sensibility and 
understanding. Furthermore, Kant distinguishes three types 
of synthesis which together constitute the ground of cog-
nition. I will briefly explicate them here. First, there is the 
synthesis of apprehension, which takes place in the empiri-
cal intuition and makes a coherent image of the manifold of 
sensations that come in through the senses. The mere 
receiving of sensations is thus insufficient to create a per-
ception; a synthesis of apprehension in intuition must take 
place which precedes an actual judgment on behalf of the 
understanding. At times, Kant also refers to it as a synopsis 
in sense (CPR A94/B127, A97). The second synthesis is that 
of reproduction, which belongs to the imagination, and 
cannot be regarded separately from the first synthesis (CPR 
A102). The third synthesis is that of recognition in the 
concept. In brief, then, we have a synthesis at the level of 
sensibility, a second synthesis in the imagination, and a third 
one bringing about the judgment.8 But only the three syn-
theses combined let one experience objects, whether cog-
nized a priori (through productive) or a posteriori (through 
                                                            
8 See also Béatrice Longuenesse (1998, pp. 35-58). 
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reproductive) imagination. Experience is thus nothing other 
than the activity of synthesizing concepts and intuitions, 
which consists in the apprehension, repro-duction and 
thirdly the recognition of intuitions (the latter in the 
concept). These syntheses bring together the under-standing, 
as ‘faculty of rules’ (CPR A126), with the sensible data to 
which they must relate in order to be about anything. In the 
Introduction to the Critique, Kant seems to refer to the 
imagination conducting these syntheses as the ‘common, but 
to us unknown, root’ of the two stems of human knowledge 
(CPR A15/B29). Consequently, the imagination takes place 
between the two sources: 
 
Both extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, 
must necessarily be connected by means of this trans-
cendental function of the imagination, since otherwise 
the former would to be sure yield appearances but no 
objects of an empirical cognition, hence there would 
be no experience (CPR A124). 
 
But the Transcendental Deduction has not succeeded yet by 
way of introducing a third faculty. In order to assure that the 
a priori concepts of the understanding apply to all possible 
and actual experiences, it would have to be proven that our 
intuitions also stand under the rules that the former provide. 
Intuition, then, Kant believes, must be governed and indeed 
made possible by the rules supplied by the understanding. If 
not, then the categories arguably do not apply to all possible 
and actual experience, and therefore they would lose their 
transcendental significance. This task is most clearly carried 
out in the B-Deduction, which is usually taken to consist of 
two steps of which the latter should provide proof of the 
application of the categories to everything provided by the 
senses.9 In the A-Deduction, as we have just seen, the 
                                                            
9 I here follow Rauscher’s (2012) recent interpretation: ‘I interpret the two 
steps of the B-Deduction as an attempt to justify the validity of the categories 
as a priori synthetic for experience by first showing their necessity and 
second explaining their universality’ (pp. 1-2). 
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imagination ensures that concepts of objects constitute an 
experience. This means that the having of an object of 
experience is dependent largely on the imagination as a 
separate faculty; it can create ‘images’ out of the manifold of 
impressions given in an intuition in order to re-present that 
which is not immediately given. It thus appears to be the 
case that transcendental apperception, in this respect, which 
in combined use with the imagination is called 
understanding (CPR A119), is needed only to supply the a 
priori categories which may ‘render its function intellectual’, 
thus allowing objective cognition (CPR A123-125). If this is 
the case, then the understanding does not appear to play the 
dominant part in providing me with an object. The imagina-
tion does most of the job already, for it enables the pro-
duction of images out of the manifold of intuitions. 
 In the B-Deduction, as is well known, Kant significantly 
alters his earlier conception of the imagination, to the extent 
that he almost omits it. Whereas Kant previously spoke of 
three sources of experience – sense, imagination, and 
apperception – he now falls back to the two sources he 
opened the Critique with: sensibility and understanding. 
This time, the power of synthesis is located entirely inside 
the understanding:  
 
Yet the combination (synthesis) […] is an act of 
spontaneity of the power of representation, and since 
one must call the latter understanding, in distinction 
from sensibility, all combination, whether we are con-
scious of it or not, whether it is a combination of the 
manifold in intuition or of several concepts […], is an 
act of the understanding (CPR B129-130). 
 
In line with this, the second step of the B-Deduction10 puts 
extra weight on an additional argument for the pervasiveness 
of the categories regarding intuitions. Kant argues that the 
fact of the unity of our representations of space and time in 
                                                            
10 The second step of the B-Deduction starts from CPR B160. 
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sensibility must already imply that all sensible intuitions, 
which are governed by space and time, depend on the 
categories, for they alone can be responsible for synthesizing 
any kind of unity, also at the level of pure sensibility.11 This 
further strengthens the rule of concepts with respect to 
intuitions, for the lowest syntheses, that of apprehension in 
intuition (or synopsis) and reproduction, are now said to 
depend on the faculty of the understanding. The second step 
of the B-Deduction offers proof of the transcendental use of 
a priori concepts in all sense perception, showing that they 
condition ‘everything that may ever come before our senses’ 
(CPR B160). ‘All synthesis’, writes Kant, ‘through which 
even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the 
categories’ (CPR B161 my italics). This reading is arguably 
more successful than the A-Deduction in establishing the 
demanded connection between the categories and empirical 
intuition, which is the primal aim of the Transcendental 
Deduction. For if all synthesis reigns from the under-
standing, and the understanding harbors the categories, then 
the categories must apply to all experience. Relocating the 
power of synthesis to the understanding therefore has two 
consequences. The positive result is that the transcendental 
use of the categories for all possible experience is better 
supported. The downside is that the intuited manifold of 
sensations itself has become essentially a product of the 
understanding and its concepts. Whereas earlier Kant 
asserted that intuitions are provided by a separate stem of 
                                                            
11 I quote: ‘But space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms 
of sensible intuition, but also as intuitions themselves (which contain a 
manifold), and thus with the determination of the unity of this manifold in 
them (see the Transcendental Aesthetic). Thus even unity of the synthesis of	  
the manifold, outside or within us, hence also a combination with which 
everything that is to be represented as determined in space or time must 
agree, is already given a priori, along with (not in) these intuitions, as 
condition of the synthesis of all apprehension. But this synthetic unity can be 
none other than that of the combination of the manifold of a given intuition in 
general in an original consciousness, in agreement with the categories, only 
applied to our sensible intuition. Consequently all synthesis, through which 
even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the categories’ (CPR 
B161).  
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knowledge, a task which supposedly could not be taken over 
by the understanding, Kant now says that a relation of 
dependency obtains from concepts to intuitions. The 
following syllogism based on the B-Deduction makes this 
apparent contradiction more clear: 
 
(P1) Intuition is first made possible through the synthesis 
of apprehension.  
 
(P2)  All synthesis is conditioned by the understanding.  
 
(C1) The synthesis of apprehension is conditioned by the    
understanding. 
 
(C2) Intuition and perception are first made possible by 
the understanding. 
 
Although clearly motivated by the overall purpose of the 
Deduction, this move is ultimately left unsupported by 
Kant.12 For why would all synthesis, those that enable per-
ception included, be governed by the understanding? Fol-
lowing this reading, we are bound to submit that to intuit an 
object means already to employ concepts. Consequently, 
there is no experience other than conceptual experience.  
 From this some important conclusions may be drawn. 
Firstly, claim (2), according to which intuitions are non-
conceptual and inexpressible in terms of concepts, is directly 
endangered. It now appears that concepts are determinative 
for the structure of intuition, and hence the domain of 
experience comprised by intuition is in fact dependent on 
concepts. This, however, also contradicts the Independency 
Thesis contained in claim (1). Whereas Kant originally 
stated that the two stems of knowledge have unchangeable 
functions – that sensibility and the understanding bring forth 
intuitions and objects independently from each other – it 
now seems that intuitions are dependent on the functions of 
                                                            12	  See	  also	  Henry	  Allison	  (1983,	  pp.161-­‐166).	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the understanding. The first of these tensions I will call the 





n the previous section I exposed a major interpretative 
problem that unfolds in Kant’s Transcendental Deduc-
tion, namely that of conceptualism or non-conceptual 
content. Kant’s separation of two stems of knowledge 
whose cooperation is necessary for experience turns out to 
result in a problem regarding the contents of intuition. It 
seems Kant has two different and irreconcilable answers to 
the question whether there exists non-conceptual content. If 
we follow the pre-critical works as well as the Trans-
cendental Aesthetic, we are bound to conclude that intuition 
and concept are fundamentally different from each other. 
The distinct contribution intuitions make has to be non-
conceptual, firstly because they are provided by a separate 
source whose function cannot be taken over by the under-
standing, and secondly because conceptual analysis alone 
cannot exhaustively describe the world as it appears to us, as 
the argument from incongruent counterparts has shown. At 
the same time, Kant wants the categories of the under-
standing to apply not just to some possible intuitions. As he 
repeatedly expresses, all experience falls under the a priori 
rules of the understanding. The unity of apperception 
conditions all that can be called mine, and therefore all that 
can rightfully be taken as existing. ‘All appearances’, writes 
Kant, ‘insofar as objects are to be given to us through them, 
must stand under a priori rules of their synthetic unity’ 
(CPR A110). Consequently, it seems that intuitions that 
cannot be synthesized in combined use of apperception and 
imagination (the understanding), cannot be experienced at 
all, and hence such intuitions cannot even be made out to 
exist or not (CPR B131-132). It is tempting to conclude, 
I 
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then, as some conceptualists have done,13 that ‘blind intu-
itions’ do not actually exist.  
 Does Kant really intend to say that all experiences that 
may rightfully be called mine are dependent on transcenden-
tal apperception and that, by consequence, it is nonsensical 
to speak of blind intuitions? The best clue we have for this 
comes from one of Kant’s most famous dictums: 
 
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind. […] Only from their unification 
can cognition arise (CPR A50-B74). 
 
This phrase has been interpreted in a variety of ways. Most 
often, it has been taken to express Kant’s conceptualism. If 
‘cognition’ in the latter sentence is taken in its wider sense, 
as signifying the apprehension of any object of experience 
whatsoever, then the unification of thoughts and concepts 
would be requisite to any possible experience. Similarly, if 
the blindness of intuitions without concepts is taken as a 
rhetorical expression serving to indicate that such blind 
intuitions do not actually exist, then the reach of concepts 
must include all possible intuition, whereby the content of 
intuition becomes conceptual at least in some significant 
sense. On the other hand, one could also take cognition here 
in a more narrow sense, referring to the possibility of 
objective judgments only, as for instance Hanna (2008, 
2011a, 2011b), Grüne (2009, 2011) and De Sá Pereira 
(2013) insist. In line with this reading, the alleged blindness 
of intuitions without concepts could indicate an actual kind 
of intuition that might contain meaningful experiential con-
tent even though being insufficient for objective knowledge. 
Being blind would mean that such intuitions do not yet 
allow me to make judgments of experience, even though 
they do represent the world independently from concept-
application. 
The first reading, according to which blind intuitions do 
                                                            
13 For instance McDowell (1994). 
                      KSO 2014:  
 
 
Corijn van Mazijk, Why Kant is a Non-Conceptualist 
but is better regarded a Conceptualist,  
 KSO 2014: 170-200, Posted June 28, 2014 
www.kantstudiesonline.net 




not exist, is well supported by Kant’s B-Deduction and 
strengthens the conceptualist’s position that all experiential 
content is conceptual in some sense yet to be determined. 
We may formalize this position as follows:14 
 
(P1) The a priori concepts of the understanding are 
necessary conditions of possibility of all synthesis 
and thus all experience. 
 
(P2) If a concept (the application of which requires 
apperception) is a necessary a priori condition of 
the possibility of experience, we are justified in 
applying it to all objects of experience. 
 
(C1) We are justified in applying the categories to all 
objects of experience (blind intuitions do not exist). 
 
If we follow this line of argument, then it seems the Critique 
excludes the possibility of non-conceptual content, at least 
insofar as all content is now essentially conceptualizable and 
made possible by concepts. This can be further illustrated by 
the following formalization:  
 
(P1) The categories and the synthetic unity of apper-
ception are necessary a priori conditions for all 
possible experiences. 
 
(P2) It is possible to have an experience to which no 
category is applied, i.e. to have non-conceptual 
content (blind intuitions are possible). 
 
(C)  It is not the case that the categories are necessary a 
priori conditions of the possibility of the experience 
of all objects. 
 
                                                            
14 See also Stephanie Grüne (2011) and Robert Hanna (2011a) for their 
versions of this syllogism. 
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In the above syllogism, the conclusion which follows from 
the second premise leads to a contradiction in the first 
premise. Consequently, if the first premise is true, the second 
must be false. Given that Kant explicitly endorses the first 
premise, there can be no non-conceptual experience 
according to Kant’s Critique.  
 Although there seems to be nothing wrong with this line 
of argument, it is clearly highly unsatisfactory. I have 
already shown that Kant’s account of pure intuitions is 
fundamentally indebted to his early views on the necessarily 
non-conceptual nature of our experience of space. Our 
experiences of space and time, the possibility of incongruent 
counterparts, and similarly our sense of orientation (Kant 
1996) all require a faculty of intuition as a non-conceptual 
source of cognition. To follow Kant on these latter remarks 
one must concede that all possible and actual intuitions have 
to have essentially non-conceptual components (Hanna 
2008). It seems, therefore, that Kant’s position is para-
doxical: to follow the Transcendental Deduction means to 
deny the Transcendental Aesthetic, and vice versa.  
 Thus far, then, Kant’s Critique does not seem to offer a 
unitary solution to the problem of how to relate concepts and 
intuitions. But things become even more abstruse once we 
focus on Kant’s at best equivocal and at worst directly con-
flicting formulations concerning what is presented in in-
tuition. Throughout the Critique, there are fragments that run 
in favor of both positions. I will not cite them all here, but it 
is worth looking at a few. In the following fragments, Kant 
seems to take a favorable stance toward conceptualism by 
denying that blind intuitions can represent the world:  
 
Without that sort of unity […] these (intuitions) would 
then belong to no experience, and would consequently 
be without an object, and would be nothing but a blind 
play of representations, i.e., less than a dream (CPR 
A112 my italics). 
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Combination […] is rather only an operation of the 
understanding (CPR B134-135 my italics). 
 
Consequently, all synthesis, through which even 
perception itself becomes possible, stands under the 
categories (CPR B161 my italics). 
 
Now in favor of non-conceptualism: 
 
Objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily 
having to be related to the functions of the under-
standing (CPR A89/B122 my italics). 
 
Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our 
intuition, for intuition by no means requires the func-
tions of thinking (CPR A90-B123 my italics). 
 
That representation which can be given prior to all 
thinking is called intuition (CPR B132 my italics). 
 
The inconsistency of these and many other fragments repre-
sent what I here call Kant’s Intuition Inconsistency. The 
latter fragments seem to make it unambiguously clear that 
objects can appear to us without the operations of the 
understanding. The former, however, clearly indicate that it 
is meaningless to speak of objects prior to the involvement 
of the understanding. The first is the dominant line of 
thought in the Transcendental Deduction, which serves to 
show that all objects of intuition fall under the rule of 
concepts. The second better reflects Kant’s position in the 
Metaphysical Exposition in the Transcendental Aesthetic. 
Part of the Intuition Inconsistency can, however, be resolved 
by stipulating the didactic function these non-conceptualist 
fragments serve in the Critique. Some of them appear right 
before the Transcendental Deduction; they do so because 
they illustrate the necessity of a deduction of the categories 
by setting them off against pure intuitions, which do not 
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require a similar deduction as they apply immediately to 
experience. But because concepts work only mediately, their 
necessary application has first to be proven in a special way. 
Hence when Kant writes that objects can appear to us 
without the functions of the understanding, this has pri-
marily a heuristic function. Unfortunately, many comment-
ators seem to have missed this point and have used the 
Intuition Inconsistency as a direct argument for a non-
conceptualistic reading.  
 The three problems distinguished can, I think, be brought 
down to a basic core dilemma: if intuitions alone present 
objects, then the understanding is superfluous; if intuitions 
do not present objects by themselves, they become bare, 
mysterious givens about which we can gain no knowledge 




n the previous section I distinguished three problems 
concerning the respective function and relations obtain-
ing between intuitions and concepts. It is now time to 
take a look at how contemporary philosophers have pro-
posed to address this problem of non-conceptual content in 
Kant’s philosophy. Recently, a number of Kant scholars has 
become involved in the debate over conceptual content in 
Kant’s thinking. Some have argued that inconsistencies can 
be solved by reading Kant as a non-conceptualist. In what 
follows, I set out to give an overview of the various argu-
ments these philosophers have presented. After that, I will 
explain why I think both conceptualists as well as non-
conceptualists are partially right. I will argue that although 
Kant is indeed in one sense a non-conceptualist, it is still 
better to regard him a conceptualist. 
 The most often heard arguments for Kantian non-
conceptualism are the following:  
 
Even though Kant writes that (a) all synthesis is governed by 
I 
                      KSO 2014:  
 
 
Corijn van Mazijk, Why Kant is a Non-Conceptualist 
but is better regarded a Conceptualist,  
 KSO 2014: 170-200, Posted June 28, 2014 
www.kantstudiesonline.net 




the understanding and (b) that concepts must apply to and 
condition all possible intuition . . . 
 
(1) Kant needs intuition to be non-conceptual to retain the 
critical function of the Critique. 
 
(2) Kant’s pre-critical work shows that he believes space 
and time to be non-conceptual. 
 
(3) Kant occasionally writes that intuition can present 
objects without the involvement of concepts. 
 
(4) Kant is here only talking about the conditions of 
possibility for objective judgments, not experience 
altogether. 
 
I do not think it is hard to see how one could reject (3) and 
(4) without too much difficulty. Argument (3) concerns 
what I have dubbed the Intuition Inconsistency. Certainly, 
the fact that Kant is inconsistent about what intuition 
provides does not by itself justify non-conceptualism. More-
over, however, that side of the Intuition Inconsistency 
favored by the non-conceptualist can be significantly 
reduced by pointing to the heuristic character of these 
fragments as I have done earlier. I doubt whether argument 
(4) as adopted by Hanna (2008), Allais (2009) and De Sá 
Pereira (2013) could hold much water either. Allais writes 
that although ‘the categories are necessary for anything to be 
an object for me’ this does not imply that ‘the categories are 
necessary for me to be perceptually presented by a 
particular’.15 Allais thus draws on a distinction in the notion 
of intuition itself: to ‘perceive a particular’, which does not 
require the understanding, and perceptually ‘representing a 
full blown object’, which is what Kant would have in mind 
in the Transcendental Deduction. This certainly is a viable 
reading of Kant and it seems to make sense to think of 
                                                            
15 Lucy Allais (2009, p. 405). 
                      KSO 2014:  
 
 
Corijn van Mazijk, Why Kant is a Non-Conceptualist 
but is better regarded a Conceptualist,  
 KSO 2014: 170-200, Posted June 28, 2014 
www.kantstudiesonline.net 




intuition this way as it would solve the Independency 
Disagreement. But one problem I have with this is that it is 
completely unclear (possibly unthinkable?) what it would 
mean to ‘perceive a particular’ without the kind of unity 
provided by the understanding. But even granted such a 
conception, the B-Deduction explicitly demands that all 
intuition – regardless of its involvement in objective 
cognition – is synthesized by the understanding. Nowhere 
does it say that there is a special sort of receptive sense-
making that could do without synthesis. So it is not easy to 
see that Kant adopts such a view. Claim (1) and (2), to the 
contrary, are not so easily explained away. In fact it seems 
that, one way or other, some form of non-conceptual content 
has to be appropriated in any interpretation of Kant’s 
philosophy if one is to take these claims seriously. 
 Can these tensions be resolved in a way that stays true to 
both Kant’s conceptualist and his non-conceptualist exclam-
ations? I believe it is possible to respect claim (1) and (2) 
distinguished above while at the same time honoring Kant’s 
conceptualism of the Transcendental Deduction. A distinc-
tion between two kinds of (non-)conceptual content might 
solve the concerns I earlier addressed as the Independency 
Disagreement and the Conceptualism Contradiction. This 
distinction has been drawn by a number of philosophers and 
in a variety of ways, but most of them did not exploit this in 
two different kinds of conceptualism. Crane, for instance, 
separates within mental content the real and the general 
content,16 a distinction which he borrows from Husserl’s 
Logical Investigations. Siewert seems to be talking about the 
same thing when he discusses the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ of 
the givenness of the object in intuition.17 The general line of 
reasoning found here is this: intuition presents me with some 
object, say, a cup of coffee on my desk. The cup of coffee is 
the intentional content toward which the act is directed. We 
could ask whether content of this kind already involves 
                                                            
16 Tim Crane (2013, pp. 239-243). 
17 Charles Siewert (2013). 
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concepts and/or is conceptualizable. However, at the same 
time, another kind of content is in play to which one is not 
intentionally related. For one, the precise way in which the 
cup of coffee is given alters incessantly. As the act of 
perception proceeds, I view the cup of coffee from a slightly 
different angle each and every moment, for instance due to 
the movements of my body. It is through content of this kind 
that I am intentionally related to the cup of coffee. Now try 
imagining that for every slight variation in the ‘how’ of a 
(for instance) perceptual appearance there would be a 
corresponding variation in what is given intentionally. This 
means that for every variation in how the cup is presented a 
different object would be given to me intentionally. This is, I 
think, hard if not outright impossible to do. Even though my 
eyes scan may scan the cup of coffee on my desk and 
present it a bit differently every time, I still see the same cup 
of coffee. We can thus separate what I propose calling the 
‘general content’ (‘what’ is given intentionally) from the real 
content (‘how’ it is given).18 The question of (non-) 
conceptualism can now likewise be split in two: that of 
general and real (non-) conceptual content.  
How does this relate back to the problem of non-
conceptual content in Kant’s philosophy? Taking Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction into account, I think it is hard to 
see how Kant could have been a general content non-
conceptualist. Kant holds that the understanding has to be 
involved in the production of unity in intuitions. Concepts 
are constitutive of the unity of the intentional or general 
content of any possible or actual perception. Likewise, these 
intentional contents are open to the synthetic unity of 
apperception: they can be judged about by the subject. By 
consequence, I believe it can hardly be denied that Kant is a 
general content conceptualist. Whatever is intentionally pre-
sented in intuition is to some degree informed by concepts 
                                                            
18 Sometimes the ‘how’ is used to refer to the mode of the act, for instance 
perception, imagination, recollection, etc., but it should be clear that this is 
not how I wish to use it here. 
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and is by transcendental necessity open to conceptualization. 
However, considering Kant’s views on space, time and 
subjective orientation, it is extremely unlikely that he would 
have considered himself at the same time a real content 
conceptualist. Our non-conceptual intuitions of space and 
time are responsible for the particularity of each intuitive 
representation. They provide perspective and orientation 
with regard to objects – particularity conditions – which are, 
conform the argument from incongruent counterparts, non-
conceptual. 
 It can thus be denied that Kant’s B-Deduction invokes 
what I have earlier called the Conceptualism Contradiction. 
The solution lies in distinguishing two kinds of concept-
ualism. For the B-Deduction does not necessitate a real 
content conceptualist reading of the Critique; it only de-
mands general content conceptualism. Therefore, Kant can 
maintain the arguments from the B-Deduction without 
contradicting his earlier remarks on space and time. The 
distinctive transcendental contribution of pure intuitions can 
in turn be exhausted in terms of real content non-
conceptualism while maintaining a conceptualist stance at 
the level of general content. The distinction might similarly 
dissolve the Independency Disagreement: although at the 
level of general content intuitions are conditioned by 
concepts, their independent contribution shows up at the 
level of real content. This is my case for Kantian general 
content conceptualism and real content non-conceptualism.  
 Hanna (2008), however, and similarly Allais (2009) and 
Heidemann (2012), are convinced of having good reasons to 
plead for a non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant. Hanna 
in particular does not seem to accept half measures; he 
wants to consider Kant a full non-conceptualist. Throughout 
his works, he draws on a number of arguments that I will not 
all treat here. I will instead focus only on the argument he 
draws from Kant’s assessment of incongruent counterparts, 
which he presents as the Two Hands Argument, in order to 
show how my interpretation contrasts with his: 
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According to THA (‘Two Hands Argument’), the 
content of perceptual states that pick out a perceivable 
natural object – such as a human hand – that has an 
actual or possible incongruent counterpart, is 
essentially non-conceptual. But it is clearly and dis-
tinctly conceivable, and therefore logically possible, 
that any perceivable natural object, and also an 
external part of anyone’s body, has an actual or 
possible incongruent counterpart. [. . .] So the cognitive 
need for essentially non-conceptual content is ubiqui-
tous in our world, in order for us to be able to 
discriminate between things and their incongruent 
counterparts (Hanna 2008, p. 57). 
 
Hanna thus sums up the Kantian doctrine against Leibnizian 
space theory, but makes it serve his own purpose of proving 
what he calls ‘essentially non-conceptual content’. The 
claim is both profound and important: Hanna extrapolates 
Kant’s argument by saying that every perceptual state must 
have essentially non-conceptual content, since all perception 
draws on capacities of (spatial and temporal) orientation that 
are endemic to intuition and which cannot be explained by 
someone having only a conceptual apparatus. I think Hanna 
is correct about this point, which conceptualists often miss 
out on. The primary function of pure intuitions is not to 
present things as ‘numerically distinct’, as Allison claims in 
his 1983 reading of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Although 
this is arguably what Kant is ultimately after in his search for 
providing a foundation of synthetic a priori knowledge, pure 
intuitions specifically provide something that is beyond 
conceptual or numerical description. However, in spite of its 
originality, Hanna’s argument, it seems to me, fails to 
transcend the level of real content non-conceptualism and is 
insufficient to rebut the claim that Kant is a general content 
conceptualist. This is what Hanna, Allais and Heidemann 
overlook: although the essentially intuitional character of 
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experience is indeed such that it cannot be addressed by 
someone with only conceptual capacities, it can nevertheless 
be conceptualized by any rational creature which does have 
both stems of knowledge. It is correct that merely the having 
of concepts is insufficient for explaining our experiences of 
space and time. But that does not mean the latter are qua 
general content closed off from conceptualization. Put 
differently, Hanna misses out on the fact that Kant can 
maintain both general content conceptualism and real 
content non-conceptualism. Kant can and to my opinion 
does regard the content of perception to be partially non-
conceptual – according to the Transcendental Aesthetic – 
but he also believes that this very same content can be 
conceptualized – conform the Transcendental Deduction. 
This view becomes all the more clear once we recall that for 
Kant space and time as non-conceptual intuitions are, al-
though constitutive of, not themselves objects of experience. 
Hence they are non-conceptual qua real content, while 
insofar as they can become objects of experience by means 
of a synthesis of the understanding, they conform to general 
content conceptualism. 
 The interpretation I have offered is equally a criticism of 
conceptualists. At the other side of the debate, recent 
Kantian conceptualists such as Ginsborg (2008) and Gomes 
(2014) are so caught up in the B-Deduction’s overt concept-
ualism that they tend to neglect the non-conceptualism of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic and the pre-critical works. 
Although they are partially right, their fallacy is to either 
ignore or try to reject altogether the point made by Hanna 
which I just transformed into a kind of Kantian real content 
non-conceptualism. Neither of the two parties, then, seems 
to consider the option that Kant endorses conceptualism and 
non-conceptualism at the same time. With this interpretation 
at hand, it can be denied that Kant’s B-Deduction invokes 
what I have earlier called the Conceptualism Contradiction 
and the Independency Disagreement: although at the level of 
general content intuitions are conditioned by concepts, their 
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independent contribution shows up at another level one 




n this paper I first explained Kant’s pre-critical views on 
the non-conceptual nature of our experiences of space 
and time. Second, I distinguished three problems that 
come to the fore mostly in the Transcendental Deduction of 
the first Critique. Third, I argued that recent debates over 
Kantian non-conceptualism are best addressed by means of 
a distinction between general and real content (non-) 
conceptualism. This resulted in the following reading:  
 
Kant is a real content non-conceptualist: 
 
(C1) Receptive experience is conditioned by bodily 
orientation and experiences of space and time which 
are necessarily non-conceptual. 
 
Kant is a general content conceptualist: 
 
(C2) All intentional content must be conditioned by 
synthesis provided by the concepts of the under-
standing and be relatable to the ‘I think’ expressed 
in the principle of the synthetic unity of apper-
ception.  
 
Current debates thrive in part on a confusion of these two 
kinds of conceptualism. Still, if one has to take a stance, I 
think the Critique leaves no doubt that Kant puts the most 
weight on general content conceptualism. This is why Kant 
is indeed in one sense a non-conceptualist, but is still better 
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